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Footnotes 
1.  256 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2001).
Bryan Garner has done yeoman work in the uphill battleto improve the writing of lawyers and judges. Most of hissuggestions for improving that writing are excellent, and
he has urged them with skill and tenacity. But I am not per-
suaded by his suggestion that judges place the citations in their
opinions in footnotes. There is some merit to the suggestion,
but not enough to offset its negative features.
The obvious objection to footnotes is that they force the
reader to interrupt the reading of the text with glances down
to the bottom of the page. They prevent continuous reading. In
doing so they make the reader work harder for the same infor-
mation. In articles, which are (in law anyway) usually much
longer than judicial opinions, and a fortiori in books, bringing
citations into the text would elongate the text unduly. But
opinions, as I say, usually are short; the two opinions of mine
that Garner quotes from in his article are only 1,300 and 2,700
words respectively, while a law-review article of 20,000 words
would be considered short. If an opinion does become very
long or clogged with citations, the author always has the
option of putting some of them in footnotes, though I myself
have never found that either necessary or appropriate; I do not
use any footnotes in my opinions, and never have during my
20 years as a judge.
A second objection weighed heavily with me in my decision
not to use footnotes in opinions. Footnotes are the very badge
of scholarly writing, and so they give a spurious air of scholar-
ship to judicial opinions. Judges are not scholars, and judicial
opinions are not scholarship, and these are important points
that footnotes in opinions obscure.
The objections to footnotes in opinions are strong enough
to shift to the proponent of footnoting citations, that is, to
Garner, the burden of persuasion. He makes three arguments
in an effort to carry his burden. The first is that it would make
the opinions more readable, especially by lay persons, who are
not accustomed to seeing citations in text rather than in foot-
notes. This is not a weighty argument. Legal professionals are
accustomed to reading citations in text; moving citations to
footnotes will not make reading opinions any easier for them.
On the contrary, it will make it harder for them. Just compare
the original to the Garner-revised version of the search-warrant
opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court; the original is the
more readable.
As for lay persons, very few of them read judicial opinions
or ever will do so. The principal exceptions are lay persons
who have a professional interest in the law, such as economists,
political scientists, and historians who do scholarly research on
law, and these people, too—who are not really lay persons—
have no difficulty reading citations in text; it is hardly a knack
that takes a long immersion in reading judicial opinions to
pick up. When opinions are published or excerpted by the
media, the citations are edited out by legal journalists, all of
whom are either law-trained or habituated by their job to the
judicial opinion style.
Garner’s second argument for footnoting citations has
slightly greater merit; it is that the “thickening” of a paragraph
of judicial prose with citations makes the paragraph less trans-
parent to its author and so impedes his efforts to express him-
self clearly. But this problem is easily overcome by the opinion
author’s deciding to write his initial draft without citations, or
with citations relegated to footnotes. When he has finished and
polished his draft, he can restore the citations to the text and
so spare the reader having to glance up and down, up and
down, up and down in order to absorb the entire opinion.
In support of his second argument Garner confuses two
separate questions. The first is whether a judge should strive to
write an opinion that would make sense to a nonlawyer; the
second is whether a judge should strive to write an opinion
that a nonlawyer would actually read. The answer to the first
question is yes, but to the second no. A judge should try to
make sense of the law, and one test of sense is whether the
judge’s arguments would be convincing to a lay person; if not,
the judge may have gotten tangled in some absurd technicality,
and should cut the Gordian knot. But having satisfied himself
that his opinion does make sense, the judge doesn’t have to go
the next step and rewrite the opinion so that it will attract a lay
audience. Nothing he does to the opinion will do that.
Garner has a third, subsidiary argument for his proposal,
that it will enable judges to include longer string citations in
their opinions. But, first, there is a downside in encouraging
judges to cite more, and, second, as I suggested earlier, a judge
who really thinks a very long string citation is necessary can
put that string in a footnote without feeling obliged to put all
his citations, or even the bulk of them, in footnotes.
Garner has made the case for his proposal seem stronger
than it is by editing the paragraphs from judicial opinions that
he quotes in his article beyond merely shifting the citations to
the footnotes. The result is an illegitimate comparison. A para-
graph that has the citations in the text is compared to a differ-
ent paragraph that has the citations in footnotes, a paragraph
that Garner has edited to make it read better irrespective of
where the citations are. He has done this with two paragaphs
from opinions of mine, and in the process has altered their
meaning. In the paragraph he quotes from my opinion in
Wright v. Pappas,1 by changing my parenthetical (“including
local taxes”) into a new sentence (“We have held that this
includes new taxes”) he has created an ambiguity: It is unclear
from his editing whether the exception to which the next sen-
tence refers (the exception for the case in which the taxpayer
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2.  256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001). 3.  138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998)
lacks an adequate state remedy) is limited to local taxes (it
isn’t). By another editing change, Garner has created a doubt
unintended by me as to whether the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits are in step with the Supreme Court.
Or consider what he’s done to my other opinion, Builders
Association of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook.2 By putting
the Croson case into a footnote preceded by “But see,” he gives
the misleading impression that I am treating this aspect of
Croson as contrary to prevailing law, rather than, as I intended
and as is clear in the original version of my opinion, as a state-
ment of that law. And he does this—so dogmatically commit-
ted is he to putting citations in footnotes—by means of a tex-
tual footnote, though he’s opposed to textual footnotes and
this one (as so often) makes the argument of the opinion diffi-
cult to follow. He also attributes to me the view that “whether
nonremedial justifications for ‘reverse discrimination’ by a
public body are ever possible is unsettled in” my circuit, creat-
ing a contradiction with the next sentence of the edited opin-
ion. (The insertion of “Meanwhile” in the following sentence
introduces additional confusion concerning the state of the
law.) The mistaken attribution is based on a misunderstanding
of my opinion in McNamara v. City of Chicago3 as holding that
the issue of the possibility of nonremedial justifications for
reverse discrimination is unsettled in my circuit. In fact the
opinion makes clear that the issue is unsettled in some other
circuits and in the Supreme Court but that the Seventh Circuit
has held that such justifications are possible.
These are details. The important point is that if Garner
wants to demonstrate that a paragraph of judicial prose is
clearer even to a law-trained reader if all the citations in it are
relegated to footnotes, he should print side by side the original
version with the footnoted version without changing a word of
text. Otherwise comparison is impossible.
Richard A. Posner is a judge on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a senior lec-
turer at the University of Chicago Law School.
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